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In this book, Robert Asher reviews some of the over-
whelming evidence for evolution, explains why evolu-
tionary biology should pose no threat to Christian faith,
and refutes oft-repeated criticisms of evolution by nat-
ural selection that many non-biologists find convincing.
Asher does a wonderful job with the evidence for evolu-
tion, although non-biologists will find parts of his pres-
entation heavy going. As a professing Christian of
conservative theological bent, I find his discussion of the
relationship between science and Christian faith basically
sound.
Nonetheless, as Asher (p. xiv) recognizes, few young-
earth creationists (who believe that God created the uni-
verse and its contents in 6 days, less than 10 millennia
ago, as told in the Bible’s first two chapters) or propo-
nents of intelligent design (who argue that God demon-
strably designed many of the ancestors of today’s
organisms) will read this book, let alone be convinced by
it. They object to evolutionary theory in the name of sci-
ence, but their objections are driven by their religious
beliefs. With sympathy, Asher discusses various bases
for their religious objections.
Asher (p. xv) recognizes that some people have more
rational grounds for rejecting evolution by natural selec-
tion. He dismisses the slander that William Jennings
Bryan was a young-earth creationist, showing that he
rejected natural selection because school textbooks used
that idea to promote social injustice. Indeed, offensive
‘utopias’ promoted by reputable scientists in the name of
evolutionary theory may still raise up anti-evolutionists
(Midgley 2002). Asher, however, seems not to realize
how many Christians oppose Darwin’s ideas because
they depend on Paley’s argument from design toCorrespondence: bufotyphonius@gmail.com
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in any medium, provided the original work is pconvince unbelievers by proofs. I beg the indulgence of
atheist readers, but to converse meaningfully on evolu-
tion with intelligent designers, criticism, based on the
nature of God as revealed in the Gospels’ depiction of
Jesus, of their desire to ‘prove’ God, is needed to open
the way.
Asher begins his book by explaining why evolutionary
theory is compatible with Christian belief. He distin-
guishes ‘agency’, the ‘why’ - by which he means
Aristotle’s final cause, or Aquinas’s first cause - from
‘cause’, the ‘how’, by which he means Aristotle’s efficient
cause or Aquinas’s secondary causes. Agency can repre-
sent God’s creative intent and sustaining activity, but
God’s agency is not detectable, or meant to be detect-
able, by any form of scientific test. In the biologist
Dorit’s (1997) fine phrase, ‘The hand of God may be all
around us, but it is not, nor can it be, the task of science
to dust for fingerprints’. The theologian John
Polkinghorne (2004) noted: ‘The eye of faith may… dis-
cern God at work, but the peculiarity of that fact cannot
be demonstrated by empirical analysis’. Asher’s ‘causes’, -
the laws of physics, mutation and genetic variation,
differential reproduction, differential mortality, and
the like - are the stuff of science, which can be studied
without reference to the direct interposition of God.
‘Intelligent design’ is therefore outside the realm of natural
science, because, as Aquinas saw, natural science deals only
with secondary - material - causes and their consequences
(Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 84, Article 1).
Asher’s distinction between agency and cause, however,
will discomfort those biologists who confuse it with
Ernst Mayr’s distinction between ultimate causes (the
adaptive why) and proximate causes (the mechanistic/
physiological how), which are both testable. Asher may
need to draw his distinction more carefully. Moreover,
some natural theologians and proponents of ‘intelligent
design’ will object to declaring God’s agency untestable -
an objection I will discuss later. Finally, Asher’s approach
will put off those who think that second causes leave no
place for God’s providence. Blaise Pascal (1976, p. 72)n Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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avoid letting God give a flick of a finger (une
chiquenaude) to set the world going, but after that, God
had nothing to do. In my teens, I lost my faith for a
few years because I thought Newton’s laws implied that
the positions and velocities of all the universe’s elemen-
tary particles at one time would determine their posi-
tions and velocities, and thus the behavior of everything
in the universe, forever after. Such determinism would
exclude God’s providence, making belief in the Biblical
God illogical. I did not realize that the data needed to
test for such determinism are inaccessible to any human
being: postulating such determinism, with its implied
limits on God’s freedom and ours, can only be an act of
faith. Nonetheless, many Christians and Muslims clearly
fear that the ‘determinism’ of natural selection from ran-
dom mutation eliminates God’s power to influence the
direction of evolution.
Asher next presents some of the evidence for evolu-
tion. He emphasizes findings from the fossil record: the
origin of mammals, the gradual transformation of reptil-
ian jaw-joint bones into mammalian ear-bones, the
stages by which elephants evolved from mammals of
very ordinary size and shape, and the stages by which
seagoing whales evolved from terrestrial ancestors of
hippopotami. He notes that today, all mammals, unlike
reptiles, drink their mothers’ milk when very young,
cease growth at or soon after sexual maturity, and have
a single jaw-bone and three small ear-bones. Moreover,
all modern mammals, unlike any modern reptile, des-
cend from furry quadrupeds with limbs under their bod-
ies (rather than splayed outward as in reptiles) and teeth
differentiated for different functions, such as incisors,
canines, or molars. Different mammal characteristics,
however, evolved at different times. Two hundred and
fifty million years ago some quadrupeds had differenti-
ated teeth and limbs under their bodies, like mammals,
but, like reptiles, they had several bones in their jaw and
just one in their ear, and they never stopped growing.
Asher observes that these fossils combine features now
considered distinctive of different major groups. Other
fossils also do so. Archaeopteryx, a no longer missing
link between reptiles and birds, had the teeth and tail of
a reptile, and the wings and feathers of a bird.
Rodhocetus, a no longer missing link between artiodac-
tyls (even-toed ungulates) and modern whales, had the
ankle bones, legs, and feet of an artiodactyl, but its feet
served as paddles, and, like modern whales, it used its
tail when swimming, and lived by catching fish in rela-
tively deep water. Unfortunately, the book’s photographs
(many of which should have been replaced by drawings),
are often not clear enough to illumine the text.
Asher also emphasizes how paleontologists, compara-
tive anatomists, and molecular biologists infer verynearly the same sequences of divergence from data in
their various fields. All agree that fish diverged from the
ancestors of human beings before amphibians; then rep-
tiles (which gave rise to birds), then pigs, then lemurs,
then monkeys, and finally, chimpanzees. More recent di-
vergence implies closer relationship: we are more closely
related to chimps than to lemurs. Indeed, one of
Darwin’s triumphs was explaining the pattern of rela-
tionships suggested by the ‘natural classifications’ of
traditional systematists. Asher cites a wonderful instance
of how evidence for evolution converges from different
lines of enquiry. The fossil record reveals the stages by
which jaw-bones in ancient reptiles became ear-bones in
modern mammals. In 1837, a German anatomist showed
that ear-bones in mammals, like the jaw-joint bones in
frogs and birds, develop from cartilage in the first two of
the visceral arches separating successive gill slits in the
tadpole-like stage of their respective embryos, a
phenomenon that only makes sense in the light of their
common ancestry. Later, a molecular biologist, Abbie
Tucker, found that a gene expressed in the embryonic
visceral-arch precursors of a mouse’s ear-bones is also
expressed in the embryonic visceral-arch precursors of a
bird’s jaw-bone. The jaw-bone-ear-bone transition shows
how features evolved for one function often become use-
ful, and become selected for (transferred to), another.
Darwin emphasized the importance in evolution of such
transfers of function, which, as Asher emphasizes, have
enabled us to understand how many complex character-
istics could evolve.
Asher’s account should suffice to establish evolution as
fact. He acts, however, as if the fact of evolution comes
very near to establishing natural selection as its cause.
This is wrong. Evolution states that all life descended,
with innumerable divergent modifications, from com-
mon ancestors. Understanding how this happened - the
origin of variation and whether, and if so how, natural
selection spread better adapted variants, is a separate
question (Fisher 1930). In the 1920s, most biologists ac-
cepted evolution as a fact but rejected natural selection
as its cause. By showing how sexual reproduction and
other features of Mendelian genetic systems implied that
natural selection of random mutations would cause both
adaptation and speciation, Fisher (1930) provided the
impetus for the ‘modern evolutionary synthesis’ between
genetics and evolution, although it took decades for the
full magnitude of his achievement to sink in.
Dobzhansky (1937) and Mayr (1942) enabled most biol-
ogists to understand how one species could evolve into
two non-interbreeding populations which, by definition,
would be separate species. David Lack (1947); Colin
Pittendrigh (1950); Robert MacArthur (1958), and many
others showed that the differences between related spe-
cies were adaptive, a circumstance earlier doubted by as
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Gerhart and Kirschner (1997); Carroll (2005), and vari-
ous others finished Fisher’s job, incorporating develop-
mental biology into the evolutionary synthesis and
establishing in satisfying detail how genetic systems are
organized to enhance the frequency of favorable muta-
tions and the effectiveness of natural selection in achiev-
ing adaptation. Margulis (1993) showed how an unusual
but crucial event, symbiogenesis (the transformation of
bacterial parasites into cooperative partners, mitochon-
dria, within one-celled archaea, and the subsequent
welding of archaea and their mitochondria into coherent
individuals called eukaryotes), caused a major evolution-
ary transition. Such work convinced most biologists that
natural selection drove adaptive evolution.
Evolutionary theorists also have a criterion for judging
whether adaptation is the product of natural selection:
natural selection favors those features that serve the
common good of the autosomal genome, the common
interest of those genes on chromosomes with homolo-
gous counterparts (as opposed to genes on the ‘sex chro-
mosomes’). This common good is served most
distinctively by the fairness of meiosis, how resources
are partitioned between producing offspring of the two
sexes, and by response to genealogical kin selection
(Grafen 2006; Leigh 2010). Asher presents no evidence
that distinguishes natural selection as the cause of adap-
tive evolution - a dangerous gap in his argument.
As various types of evidence converge, and as more
‘missing links’ are found, the case for evolution grows
ever stronger. Thanks in part to the prodding questions
of intelligent designers, the case for natural selection as
evolution’s director is nearly as strong. Meléndez-Hevia
et al. (1996); Miller (2004); Finnigan et al. (2012), and
others are showing that various examples of ‘irreducible
complexity’ - structures which ‘could not have evolved’
by a succession of intermediate stages, each more advan-
tageous than the last - are in fact reducible. Usually, it is
clear that components of such structures originally
evolved for other purposes, although we are still far from
knowing all the stages by which these structures evolved.
Perhaps intelligent designers’ questions about ‘irredu-
cible complexity’ in bacterial biochemistry will find
their answers in mechanistic studies of the origin of
life (cf. Martin and Russell 2007). No amount of evidence,
however, convinces committed creationists of evolution.
Instead, they deny that natural selection of random mu-
tations can produce complex adaptation, asserting that
only God can do so. Their argument’s vulgar form dis-
misses adaptation by natural selection of random muta-
tions as sheer chance, likening it to the assembly of a
jumbo jet by a hurricane crossing a junkyard (Asher,
p. 78). Artificial selection, however, which works on
the same sorts of variation as its natural counterpart(Darwin 1859), has effected stunning changes in do-
mesticated plants and animals that have helped to
feed a hungry world. Natural selection, like its artifi-
cial counterpart, is a constructive process, each step
building on a previous change, a feature which, as
Asher observes, anti-Darwinians tend to ignore.
According to Fisher (1930, p. 37), the claim that:
‘Natural selection depends on a succession of
favourable chances’ is ‘more in the nature of an
innuendo than a criticism, for it depends for its force
on the ambiguity of the word chance, in its popular
uses. The income derived from a Casino by its
proprietor may, in one sense, be said to depend on a
succession of favorable chances, although the phrase
contains a suggestion of improbability more
appropriate to the patrons of his establishment. It is
easy… to perceive the difference between a succession
of favourable deviations from the laws of chance, and
… the continuous and cumulative action of those
laws. It is on the latter that the principle of natural
selection depends.’
In sum, natural selection of random mutations is a
principle of order, leading to adaptation, not a principle
of disorder, leading to chaos.
Intelligent design advocates accept the universe’s great
age, and some accept the fact of evolution: they, too,
balk at the power of natural selection of random muta-
tions to yield observed adaptation. Focusing on this issue
has shifted the debate about natural selection from pit-
ting the word of scientists against the Bible’s - a futile
exercise - to a thesis that can be discussed rationally. In-
telligent designers revealed a weakness in evolution
teaching - neglect of how genetic systems are organized
to allow adaptation to evolve - for which Kirschner and
Gerhart (2005) and others provided a remedy. On the
other hand, evolutionary biologists can now ask why, if
God miraculously designed each species for its role in
life, they are designed, as if by natural selection, to favor
the common good of their autosomal genomes.
Despite this shift, the debate remains sterile. Behe
(1996) wrote a book denying that natural selection could
produce the complex array of chemical reactions on
which bacteria depend. I refuse to fault Behe for asking
this question: 25 years earlier, a renowned biochemist,
an atheist, confessed the same view to me. Yet, judging
by Coyne (1996) and Cavalier-Smith (1997), Behe’s re-
views were not just critical, but downright hostile. What
happened? First, Behe (1996, p. 233) celebrated the
‘proof ’ that cells are intelligently designed as ‘one of the
greatest achievements in the history of science’. Did he
not realize that most scientists view invoking miracles to
explain natural phenomena as a confession of utter
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and Stuart Kaufman on the list of anti-Darwinians (Behe
1996, p. 27ff ) arouses memories of the truth-twisting
tactics of professional creationist speakers mentioned by
Asher (p. 141), and detailed by Eldredge (2000, pp. 17f,
129ff ). Could Behe really believe that Coyne was anti-
Darwinian? Third, the theory of evolution by natural se-
lection makes a cornucopia of distinctive, often precise,
well-confirmed predictions ranging from the nature of
adaptation to biogeographic patterns such as presence of
most of an island’s residents’ nearest relatives on the
nearest continent, and the contrasts between island and
mainland ecosystems (Darwin 1859). Dobzhansky’s dic-
tum that ‘nothing in biology makes sense except in the
light of evolution’ is amply justified (Losos 2011).
Abandoning a theory rich enough in predictive power to
be the unifying principle of biology because one cannot
imagine a sequence of steps by which selection could
achieve this or that complex adaptation places a pre-
mium on one’s powers of imagination that most evolu-
tionary biologists find unacceptable.
Unfortunately, Darwinians’ studied incuriosity about
why Behe wrote his book parallels Richard Cheney’s re-
fusal of sympathetic curiosity about the motives of those
who destroyed the World Trade Center, and the studied
incuriosity many intelligent designers feel about the
workings of nature, which they, Asher and I all believe
to be God’s creation - which He pronounced good. Such
incuriosity about one’s opponents, or one’s surroundings,
is equally self-defeating for debaters, scientists, politi-
cians and generals: it does not prompt effective
behavior.
Evolutionary biologists must understand that no
evidence is likely to convince a creationist or intelli-
gent designer who believes that accepting evolution by
natural selection means abjuring their faith in a mean-
ingful God. Although much Christian witness (acting
out Christian faith in deed or word), including the
ways some Christians treat those who disagree with
them, hardly attracts sympathetic understanding, those
acquainted with genuine Christian hope will readily
understand why no one would want to lose it. It is ac-
cordingly counterproductive to announce, with Monod
(1970) and Dawkins (1976), the ‘scientific’ conclusion
that God cannot exist and the universe is meaningless.
Dawkins (1976, p. 2) is unwise and wrong to assert
that ‘“nature red in tooth and claw” sums up our
understanding admirably’ and that ‘a predominant
quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless
selfishness. This gene selfishness will usually give rise
to selfishness in individual behavior.’ Dawkins’s atti-
tude has many parallels among evolutionary biologists.
This attitude brings to mind an observation of Bernanos
(1953, p. 279):‘Were the creation simply the work of intelligence,
then human intelligence could do better than
discovering some of its laws in order to exploit this
knowledge as if one might use a machine. Human
intelligence would not be always ready to condemn
the creation in the name of logic or justice. But
creation is a work of love. Reduced to its own
resources, intelligence believes that it can find in
nature only indifference and cruelty, but the cruelty it
sees in nature is its own… Intelligence is more cruel
than nature’ (translated by the reviewer).
Darwin, however, saw meaning in nature and evolu-
tion. His view of nature is far more appealing, and far
better rooted in evolution, than Dawkins’s. Darwin real-
ized that selection often favored social behavior, and
asserted that ‘our moral sense is fundamentally identical
with the social instincts; and in the case of the lower ani-
mals it would be absurd to speak of these instincts as hav-
ing been derived from selfishness’ (Darwin 1871, pp. 97f).
Indeed, Darwin viewed our social instincts, our mutual
concern for fellow group members, as adaptations for
group life inherited from our social ancestors. Adam Smith
anticipated Darwin by showing how competition can bring
forth the most complex, intricate, and extensive mutual-
isms on this earth: human economies. It is no accident
that David Sloan Wilson, who emphasizes, quite rightly,
the many forms of cooperation that influence evolution,
has helped teach one of the few university courses that
actually convince creationists of Darwinism (Wilson
2007, pp. 7ff).
Intelligent design and ‘scientific creationism’, however,
are not merely scientific errors based on revulsion at
the consequences of a grossly oversimplified and
misinterpreted version of evolutionary theory. They are
based on a theological mistake (this criticism does not
apply to those who are creationists out of simple faith in
the Bible). First, ‘proving’ the existence of God to chil-
dren in public schools by demonstrating that species
were intelligently designed would allow intelligent de-
signers to bludgeon unbelievers by proofs rather than
taking the trouble to win them over by showing forth
the love of Christ. As Pascal (1976, p. 121) points out,
this is a most unbiblical procedure. Digging more deeply,
Bernanos (1953, p. 273f ) argued:
‘If God had wished to win us by miracles, he certainly
would have not stopped with Cana, or even the
resurrection of Lazarus. It would have cost Him
nothing to impose Himself by much more
extraordinary, indeed cosmic, prodigies. Instead, what
the Holy Gospels tell us of the phenomena marking
the death of the Savior, the darkening of the sun, the
rending of the veil in the temple, the quaking of the
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Hiroshima. But let’s go further and think a bit. Why
win us back by using miracles to force our will?
Speaking of constraint, it would have been far easier
to avoid losing us by according our wills with His
once for all, like the planet constrained to circle
around the sun. But God did not want to make us
irresponsible, that is to say, incapable of love, for
there is no responsibility without freedom and love is
a free choice, or it is nothing.’ (Translated by the
reviewer)
This statement does not imply that Christianity de-
mands an arbitrary, unreasonable leap of faith. Pascal
(1976, p. 122f ) rightly said ‘Faith is different from proof:
one is human, the other is a gift from God. “The just
shall live by faith”: it is this faith that God puts in one’s
heart: “faith comes by hearing”. He often does so with
the help of proofs, but this faith is in one’s heart, and
makes one say not “I know” but “I believe”.’ (translated
by the reviewer). Arguments from design, such as the
precise adaptation of the laws of nature that makes our
universe a suitable home for life, have helped people to
faith. Such arguments, however, are never coercive
(Polkinghorne 2004): they do not exempt one from the
need, or the freedom, to choose. Moreover, these argu-
ments promise a Creator, but do not imply God’s provi-
dence. Since Christianity first spread by preaching
Christ, why do Christians not base their arguments on
His life and work? Focus on Gospel accounts of His do-
ings and teaching (Yoder 1972) has changed lives and
forged saints. And, although the occasional Episcopal
bishop has denied His resurrection to conform to the
world of science, denying His resurrection or the genu-
ineness of His teaching as recorded in the Gospels re-
quires accepting other troubling implausibilities (Wright
1996, 2003). Wright’s arguments are not proofs; they
only show that accepting Christianity does not defy rea-
son or historical evidence. In the end, opting for faith is
far more like choosing whom to marry than choosing
the best explanation for a set of scientific data. Know-
ledge plays an integral role in the choice, but the choice
should be based on love.
Phillip Johnson, the best-known proponent of intelli-
gent design at the turn of the millennium (Eldredge
2000), reveals the fears that drive the thinking of many
intelligent designers and ‘scientific creationists’. He pro-
motes intelligent design because he fears that methodo-
logical naturalism (MN, his term for science based
entirely on second causes), when ‘understood pro-
foundly’, makes theism ‘intellectually untenable’ (Johnson
1995). In particular, Johnson (1995, p. 211) fears that ‘if
employing MN is the only way to reach true conclusions
about the history of the universe, and if the attempt toprovide a naturalistic history of the universe has con-
tinually gone from success to success, and if even theists
concede that trying to do science on theistic premises al-
ways leads nowhere or into error…, then the likely ex-
planation for this state of affairs is that naturalism is
true and theism is false’. On the same page, he contemp-
tuously dismisses the possibility that ‘God actively di-
rects the evolutionary process but (for some inscrutable
reason) does so in a way that is empirically impercept-
ible’. Johnson seems unable to accept that God would
create in a way that does not coerce belief.
The ‘evolution-creation wars’, moreover, reflect a clash
between two views of God, already foreshadowed by the
conflicting views of Johnson and Polkinghorne on the
empirical perceptibility of God’s influence on nature. St.
Thomas Aquinas describes the clash:
‘Some have understood God to work in such a way
that no created power has any effect on things, but
that God alone is the immediate cause of everything
wrought… But this is impossible. First, because the
order of cause and effect would be taken away from
created things, and this would imply lack of power in
the Creator’ (Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 105,
Article 5).
Polkinghorne (2004) extends the logic of Aquinas to
evolution:
‘Although the Creator could … have brought into
being a ready-made world, God has in fact “brought”
into being a creation that could make itself… The
Creator is not the Cosmic Tyrant whose unrelenting
grip holds on tightly to all. Such an enslaved world
would not be the creation of a loving God. Rather,
creation is allowed to be itself and make itself.’
Francisco Ayala (2007, pp. 4-5) mentions how, in
Franco’s Spain, his seminary professors welcomed Dar-
winism so that they could avoid blaming God for malig-
nant creatures like malaria mosquitoes. Polkinghorne,
however, has probed much deeper. Curiously, Fisher
(1950), also a Christian, anticipated Polkinghorne. Fisher
called a process creative if it involved successive choices
between alternatives not themselves fully predetermined
and denied creative status to development by determin-
istic law. Natural selection chooses between alternatives
that are not fully predetermined, thereby imparting in-
formation to surviving organisms’ descendants on how
to cope with their environment. Fisher therefore consid-
ered selection creative. He saw the theory of natural se-
lection as placing the creative causes shaping evolution
‘in the actual life of living things… especially in the vital
drama of the success or failure of each of their
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themselves are the chief agents of the Creative activity…
they work their effect by doing or dying…’ (Fisher 1950,
p. 20), although most do so without conscious choice or
foresight. Just as Aquinas saw created things as endowed
with causality, so Fisher and Polkinghorne saw living
populations as endowed with the freedom to evolve.
Such freedom, however, entails a cost. Evil among hu-
man beings arises from God creating us with free will: as
Bernanos (1953, p. 280) remarked ‘The scandal of the
universe is not suffering but freedom. God made his cre-
ation free: that’s the root scandal, from which all the
other scandals result’ (translated by the reviewer).
Dostoyevsky’s fable of the Grand Inquisitor in The
Brothers Karamazov, and the Spanish bishops’ and
clergy’s very real complicity in the shooting of truckloads
of randomly chosen peasants without trial to terrorize
the others into obeying Franco’s government, confessing
their sins to a priest, and attending Easter communion
(Bernanos 1938) illustrate how many professing Chris-
tians disapprove of God creating us free. Similarly, evil
in the natural world arises in part from the freedom to
evolve: natural selection is driven by the early death, or
failure to reproduce, of many of the less adapted.
The religiously inspired attack on evolutionary theory
damages Christianity in many ways. First, blaming evolu-
tionary biology for atheism and immorality merely dis-
tracts attention from the devastating impact of poor
Christian witness, especially the evil things done in
Christ’s name. Just as the shifty tactics of professional
creationists promotes atheism among evolutionary biolo-
gists, so the support of many professing Christians for
the Iraq war in hopes of spreading Christianity there
made this faith repulsive in many people’s eyes. Second,
the attempt of creationists and intelligent designers to
erode the constitutional separation between church and
state by making public schools teach doctrines meant to
buttress religious belief does Christianity no good.
Throughout history, trying to make the state serve the
church has always ended in the church serving, and be-
ing corrupted by, the state. Third, many deny evolution
to deny our relationship to the rest of creation. Ignoring
this relationship left it to the atheist Voltaire to remind
Christians that other animals have the same organs,
nerves, and so on that we do and ask how they could
not feel pain as we do (Midgley 1983). In the second
chapter of Genesis, the Bible teaches that people are the
lords and stewards of Creation, whose duty it is to tend
and care for it. Yet, denying the relationship between
human beings and other animals in order to buttress
their faith left it to Voltaire to mention facts bearing
crucially on the responsibilities of such lordship. This is
because, to excuse this denial, many Christians dogmat-
ically deprecate the abilities of other animals to maketools, distinguish between fair and unfair treatment, an-
ticipate or even feel pain, even the ability of a dog to an-
ticipate the pleasures of a walk. In essence, they
deprecate the Creator’s generosity - an odd way to praise
Him. Many of those Christians who insist that the earth
and its resources were created only for us to exploit in
any way we choose are not Christ-like lords and stew-
ards of Creation.
Intelligent designers’ fear of evolutionary biology arises
from a siege mentality that reveals a lack of faith in God.
Siege mentality has no place in genuine Christianity. It is
joyless. Absence of joy, especially when born of lack of
faith, engenders poor Christian witness. Bernanos (1938,
pp. 234f) imagines an atheist speaking to a congregation
gripped by siege mentality: ‘When you leave the confes-
sional, you are in “a state of grace”… We wonder what
you do with the grace of God. Should it not shine forth
from you? Where the devil do you hide your joy?’ One
of life’s joys is that of finding things out and discovering
their marvelous order. Darwin experienced a full meas-
ure of this joy. Asher effectively communicates the joy of
seeing how much of biology makes sense in the light of
evolution. Christians sharing the medievals’ confidence
that science rightly done cannot conflict with the Bible
rightly interpreted can share this joy. This joy, moreover,
is essential to modern life. ‘In spite of what has recently
been written to the contrary, it is hardly to be doubted
that most of human progress, insofar as it depends on
purely intellectual factors, is ultimately based on the
mental pleasure arising from seeing new facts as special
cases of generalizations, or new generalizations arising
from old and new facts.’ (Hutchinson 1953, p. 145). Let
no one’s fears take this joy from us.
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